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Tax Policy, the Rate of Return, and Savings
Abstract
The theoretical and empirical results in this paper make a strong
prfria facie case for the proposition that increases in the after tax
rate of return caused by tax policy are likely to bring forth signi-
ficant increases in saving. Theoretical analysis using a variety of
standard models tends to suggest that the aggregate response to savings
incentives is likely to be substantial. It is argued that the existing
empirical evidence sheds little light on the question. Empirical anal-
yses are then conducted using three alternative approaches. All three
confirm the hypothesis of a significant positive response of savings to
changes in the rate of return.
Lawrence H. Summers




The effects of the rate of return on the level of savings and the
rate of capital formation are of central concern to both economists and
policymakers. Although the welfare effects of tax reforms do not directly
depend on their impact on savings, the effects of taxes on savings is
crucial to considerations of tax incidence and equity and to the issue of
long run growth. The impact of the rate of return on consumption and
savings decisions also bears on questions regarding the appropriate govern-
ment discount rate, the short run crowding out effects of fiscal policy,
and the effects of public indebtedness on capital intensity.
The'traditional view among economists is that changes in the rate of
return are likely to have only a small effect on the savings rate. This
consensus is supported by theoretical arguments pointing to the opposing
income and substitution effects associated with changes in the rate of
return. The ambiguous implications of theory are matched by empirical
studies which yield conflicting estimates as to the size of the impact of
changes in the rate of return. The polar empirical estimate is Michael
Boskin's (1978) suggestion that the interest elasticity of savings is .4.
This estimate is widely regarded as too high.
This paper re—examines the theoretical arguments and presents new
enpiricalevidence regarding the interest elasticity of savings. Both the
theoretical analysis and the empirical work demonstrate the strong likelihood
that increases in the real after—tax rate of return received by savers would
lead to substantial increases in long run capital accumulation. While it is
not possible to quantify the impact with any precision, the econometric results
here suggest that a shift towards expenditure taxation would lead to substantial
increases in the private savings rate.—2—
The theoretical analysis emphasizes the importance of recognizing hetero-
geneity among savers in examining the effects of tax changes which raise the
rate of return available to savers. It begins by demonstrating that even if
all savings decisions are determined by rule of thumb, savings are likely to
be elastic with respect to the rate of return, as long as the rules of thumb
differ persistently across households. The effects of changes in the rate of
the long run elasticity of savings is infinite. Some illustrative calculations
suggest that the short run impact is also likely to be substantial. While the
sign of the response of savings to a change in the interest rate cannot be
determined unambiguously from theoretical considerations, consideration of
several models leads to a presumption in favor of a positive response.
No single empirical model can possibly capture all the many factors which
influence aggregate consumption. This paper utilizes three different empirical
approaches to examine the effects of changes in the rate of return on the level
of capital accumulation. The fact that all three methods, each based on quite
different simplifying assumptions, yield quite similar results suggests the
robustness of the conclusion that rate of return effects on savings are both
substantively and statistically significant. The first method is based on a
modification of the standard consumption function specification to take account
of the effects of changes in the interest rate on the level of human wealth.
return on savings is then considered in a realistic multi—period life—cycle
framework. Within such a framework, the importance of recognizing future
labor income in analyzing savings is stressed. It is shown that for a wide
range of utility function parameters, the interest elasticity of savings is
likely to be positive. Since recent research suggest the importance of bequests
in determining aggregate capital formation, models of intergenerational trans-
fers are also considered. It is shown that as long as any part of the economy
is comprised of households with operative intergenerational transfer motives,—3--
Thistype of estimation is necessarily dependent on a procedure for modelling
expectations. The second method follows recent work by Hall (1981), Hansen
and Singleton (1981), and Mankiw (1981) in attempting direct estimation of the
utility function of the representative consumer. Earlier work is extended
by allowing for demographic changes and the existence of liquidity constrained
consumers. A third approach involves estimating reduced forms linking the
wealth—labor income ratio to the after tax real rate of return. This procedure
allows for a more direct test of the impact of changes in the rate of
return on capital intensity. The plan of the paper is as follows.
The implications of economic theory for the relation between the rate of
return and savings are reviewed in the first section. The link between theory
and previous empirical work on rate of return effects on savings is also
considered. The second, third and fourth sections utilize three alternative
empirical approaches in order to test the theoretical predictions. A final
section summarizes the paper and considers the implications of the results
for future research.—4—
I.Taxation and Savings
In a closed economy, it is not possible to imagine how the rate of return
to savers could change without other relevant economic variables also changing.
Thus, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of the shock causing the rate
ofreturn to change. Discussions of the "interest elasticity of savings" are apt
tobe misleading since the change in savings associated with any given change in
the rate of return to savers will depend on what caused the rate of return to
change. The analysis here focuses on the effects of tax policies which alter
the rate of return available to savers. Any tax change will affect revenue col-
lections and so must be associated with changes in either government spending,
public borrowing or other tax collections. The analysis here is all based on
a differential incidence approach, where it is assumed that spending and total
revenue collections remain constant so that changes in capital income taxes are
offset by adjustments to payroll or consumption taxes. All the discussion is,
therefore, about compensated effects. An effort is made to maintain this dis-
tinction in drawing implications from the empirical work reported below.
The discussion here focuses on the "partial equilibrium effects" of a
change in the rate of return. It is assumed that factor prices are unaffected
by changes in the savings rate. Thus the analysis addresses the supply of
savings schedule rather than the reduced form relationship between tax changes
and capital intensity. In the special cases of a small open economy or a
noted below, "compensated savings effects" are not well defined because
savings are not a commodity. As illustrated in Summers (1981), the effect
of a tax change will depend on the timing of compensation.production function with an infinite elasticityof substitution, the assump-
tion of constant factor prices will be valid. Otherwise,it would be neces-
sary to consider the aggregate productionfunction in assessing the effect
of a change in tax policy on savings.
It is natural to ask why the effect of tax policy on the level of
capital accumulation is an interesting question, since the government can
always neutralize the effect of any tax change by enlarging or contracting
the deficit. For this reason, Stiglitz (1978) advocates the use of a
"Balanced Growth Incidence" approach. As already noted, the excess burden
associated with a capital income tax is not directly dependent on its impact
on savings. At a minimum, in order to carry out an appropriate offsetting
debt poliby, it is necessary to know the savings effect of a given tax reform.
Equally important, the government has multiple targets and may be unable or
unwilling to assign debt management policy to the goal of attaining optimal
capital intensity. Beyond its utility in determining optimal tax policy,
an analysis of the effect of changes in the rate of return on private savings
decisions is of scientific interest since it may help to explain differences
in savings rates across time and space. The sensitivity of savings to the
rate of return is also of central importance to macro—economic questions
such as the relative short run efficacy of fiscal and monetary policies.
Rule of Thumb Savings
We begin by examining the simplest possible model of savings behavior,
one which assumes that Individuals have fixed savings propensities. Even in
such a setting, compensated reductions in capital income taxes will increase
capital accumulation as long as there is heterogeneity among income earners.—6—
At the outset it is useful to review the effects o
in a simple economy where all individuals are identical
disposable income. It is assumed that the labor force
that the rate of labor augmenting technical change is g.
ratio of capital to effective labor supply is constant.
that steady state capital intensity is determined by the
f changes in tax policy
and save a fixed s of
grows at rate n, and
In steady state, the
This condition implies
condition:
s(w(l—t )+r(1—t )k) =(n+g)k, (1) w r
where w is the wage, r is the rate of return on capital, and t andtr are
respectively the tax rates on labor and capital income. It is useful to re-
cord for future reference that government revenue R is given by:
Rtw+trk. (2) w r
Equation (1) implies that steady state capital intensity can be written expli-




At this point we are ready to compare the effects of wage and capital income
taxation on the level of capital accumulation. Two types of comparison are of
interest. The short—run effect can be gauged by considering a revenue preserving
tax cut on the level of savings holding the size of the capital stock constant.
The long—run impact can be gauged by examining the change in the steady state
capital stock following a change In tax structure. In the simple model described
here it is easy to verify that any change from wage to capital income taxation
which holds the level of revenue collections constant will have no impact on
savings in the short run on capital accumulation in the long run. Note, how-
ever, that if the specification is taken literally it implies that a switch to
expenditure taxation would raise savings. This is an artifact of the definition
of disposable income and is of little economic significance.
These strong conclusions disappear once heterogeneity among savers is re-
cognized. It is immediately apparent that in a Kaldorian world where the savings
propensity out of capital income exceeds that out of labor income, a shift from
capital income taxes towards labor income taxes will raise the savings rate.
Here we consider the case where the savings rates among different individuals
differ, but do not depend on the source of income. A variety of considerations
suggest that there are likely to be large variations in individuals' propensity
to save. Many individuals are permanently liquidity constrained. One estimate by
Hall and Mishkin (1982) suggests this description fits 20 percent of the population.
Individuals also differ in their desire to leave bequests, and in their subjective
rates of time preference. These are further reasons to believe that savings
propensities differ. This inference is strongly supported by the available empi-
rical evidence. Cross section studies typically find substantial variations in
individual consumption and wealth holding even after taking account of a variety—8--
of economic variables and individual characteristics. For example, Feldstein
(1980) finds that after taking account of a large number of individual
characteristics, the explanatory power of an equation explaining the wealth!
lifetime income ratio of aged married couples was quite low.
There is little evidence available on the persistence of individual
differences in savings propensities. In order to illustrate the effects
of heterogeneity, I consider the polar case where all differences are
permanent. To the extent that differences do not persist, the analysis here
will overstate the effects of heterogeneity. Suppose that a fraction
a. of effective labor input is supplied by individuals in class i, who identi-
cally have savings rates s. Then it is clear that in steady state:






where k. represents the capital owned by class i. The share of the capital
stock owned by individuals of class i is given by:




Equation (5) implies that high savings classes own a disproportionate share—9—
of national wealth. e consider the effects of changing the tax rates on
capital and labor income. Equations (2) and (5) imply that in the short run,
with k constant:
ds






Inspection of equation (5) shows that the expression in (6b) is greater
than that in (6a). Since capital is disproportionately owned by
individuals with a high marginal propensity to save, taxes on capital income
reduce savings more than taxes on labor income.
The potential significance of heterogeneity can be illustrated with a
simple numerical example. Suppose there are two classes with equal labor
incomes, so l 2 .5, and that s1 =.15and s2.05. Suppose for
approximate realism that n +g=.03,and that r =.1, =.2and tr
N N
Then Z cs.= .10 and E Y1s= .13. This implies that replacing one dollar
1=1
:i 1—i
of capital income tax with that of labor income tax would raise national
savings by about three cents. In this example, a switch to complete wage
taxation which held revenue constant would raise the savings rate by about
five percent in the short run.
This calculation describes the short—run impact of a change in tax
policy. The long—run effect of substituting capital income taxes for labor—10—
taxes is to shift the distribution of after—tax income towards the high
savings classes, further increasing the impact on capital accumulation.
This is easily seen using the preceding numerical example. A switch to
wage taxation raises the steady state capital stock and savings rate by
12 percent. It raises the share of capital owned by the high savings
class from .78 and .83. This calculation underestimates the likely actual
effect of heterogeneity because the dispersion of savings rates is quite
narrow. A more realistic calculation which allowed for liquidity constrained
consumers with zero marginal propensities to save would suggest even larger
effets.
The basic result here would continue to be valid in any model of
heterogeneous consumers. Tax changes which redistribute income towards
"high savers" will raise capital accumulation. It is likely that individuals'
wealth holdings are positively related to their savings propensities.
Hence reduction in capital income taxes redistributes income towards
persons with high savings propensities and increase total savings.
The same argument implies that any tax measure which redistributes
income toward high income individuals is likely to encourage savings, since
high income earners are likely to have high savings propensities, if only
because the return on wealth is one component of income. A final application
of the argument is to the effect of a tax levied at the corporate level, if
individuals cannot completely pierce the corporate veil.—11--
Life Cycle Savings
This section reviews and extends the argument in Summers (1981)
suggesting that realistic formulations of the life—cycle hypothesis imply
a very substantial long run response of capital accumulation to tax measures
which change the after tax rate of return. The simulation results reported
there are extended by considering a wider class of utility functions and tran-
sitory as well as permanent changes in the rate of return.
Iwork here with a simple continuous time formulation of the life—cycle
hypothesis. It is assumed thatall workers at a point in time receive the
samereal wage which grows at rate g, and thatcapitalmarkets are perfect
sothat individualscan both borrow and lend at the riskless interest rate r.
Also,I assume that individuals maximize a constant elasticity of
substitution utility function with a fixed discount rate, subject to the
constraint that thepresent value of future lifetime consumption equals the
sumof assets and the present value of future labor income. That is,
they solve the problem:
T





At+ 5w(l_w)_[r(l_tr)g1 (s-t) ds.
where Tis the individual's certain age of death, T is the retirement age,
isthewageand t, tY and tc are the taxratesof interest income, labor income













where HWt equals the second term on the right hand side of (7) .Notethat
the after tax interest rate affects consumption in two ways. The marginal
propensity to consume out of total wealth +HW3is a positive function
of the rate of return if y<O and a negative function if y>O. In the y0
case, which corresponds to the case of Cobb—Douglas utility, the propensity
to consume is independent of the interest rate. Inspection of (7) shows
that human wealth HW is unambiguously negatively related to the interest rate
since increases in the rate of return reduce the discounted present value
of future labor income. It follows immediately that if y>O, the uncompensated
value of is positive, for consumers of all ages so that aggregate private
savings is negatively related to the rate of capital taxation. If changes in
capital tax rates are financed from permanent changes in consumption rates,
the same result unambiguously holds for compensated changes.
In the more plausible case where y<O, the effect of a reduction in
capitalincome taxation is ambiguous depending on whether the "human wealth"
effect outweighs the effect on the propensity to consume. Note that the
humanwealth effect is likely to be greatest for young workers since their
labor income lies furthest in the future. Below, this is illustrated
numerically for some plausible utility function parameters.
The maximum problem (7) can be solved to determine the effects of
transitory as well as permanent changes in the rate of return. The analytic
solution is cusbersome and not very revealing. Therefore, Table 1 reports
some numerical calculations of the interest elasticity of consumption expen——13—
diture and savings based on plausible parameter values. The trans-
itory change in the interest rate is assumed to last for five years. In
these calculations, the parameter values assumed are: •T50, T =40,
'S .03, and y =.02and initial r =.04.The initial value of At for
each age group is calculated from the solution to the maximization problem (7).
The results regarding the sensitivity of savings and consumption to the after
tax rate of return are not sensitive to these choices of parameter values.
In interpreting the table, note that in some cases, which are asterisked,
the initial savings rate is negative. These calculations can be interpreted
as either uncompensated elasticities, or, since (8) implies that t does not
affect the level of savings, as compensated elasticities of savings, where the
adjustment to restore revenues is made through the consumption tax.
As one would expect, consumption responds more negatively to the rate
of return in the cases where the elasticity of substitution between present
and future consumption (-)isgreater. Permanent changes in the rate of
return reduce consumption by more, or increase it by less than do
transitory changes. This is because of the greater impact of permanent
changes in the interest rate on human wealth. The results also show a
tendency for the interest elasticity of consumption to rise with age
reflecting the diminishing importance of the human wealth effect.
These calculations have serious implications for previous empirical
studies of the interest sensitivity of aggregate consumption. First, they
show clearly for all age groups the importance of distinguishing between
permanent and transitory changes in the rate of return. In all likelihood,
the five year long transitory shocks considered here overstate the persistence
of the variations in interest rates during the sample periods usually studied
in empirical work. Thus, it is clearly possible that even though transitory—i-LI—
changesin the rate of return are found to have little or no effect on
consumption, permanent changes, such as those caused by tax policy, might
have a large effect. The existing empirical evidence sheds no light on
this possibility.
There is a second problem with traditional empirical approaches——the
use of labor or disposable income rather than human wealth as an explanatory
variable. The importance of this error can be seen by considering the y=O
rows of Table 1. Since, in this case, the effect of changes in the rate of
return on the propensity to consume is zero, the elasticities reflect only
the human wealth effect. Clearly, they are quite substantial. It is,
perhaps, surprising that,nottaking account of these effects, previous
eapirical work hasfailedto find a positive relationship between the real
rate of return and consumption.
In Summers (1981), I show how the effects of changes in the after tax
rate of return on long run capital accumulation can be calculted by aggregating their
effects on consumers of different ages. The following expression is derived

















Effects of a Change in the Rate of Return on Life Cycle Consumers
Source: Calculations described in the text. In
initial level of savings is negative.















0* 0 —.70 —12.1 —.18 —3.18
0* —1 —.33 — 2.3 —.09 — .65
0* —5 —.112 — .59 —.03 — .17
0* —50 — .02 — .09 — .01 — .03
10 0 — .55 15.70 —.18 5.07
10* —1 — .25 — 5.1 —.10 —1.42
10* —5 — .08 — .21 —.04 .162
10* —50 — .001 — .620 —.02 .434
20 0 — .36 2.16 —.165 1.087
20 —1 — .14 .898 —.088 .50
20 —5 .004 — .049 —.054 — .149
20 —50 .061 — 1.341 —.018 — .536
30 —0 — .051 .71 —.114 .623
30 —1 .01 .17 —.041 .297
30 —5 .12 — .15 .005 .101
30 —50 .61 —.0271 .025 .020
40 0 0 .47 .077 .360
40 —1 .094 .270 .162 .195
40 —5 .161 .17 .218 .113
40 —50 .183 .19 .242 .082—16—
Table 2 presents calculation of the savings rate given in (9) for
a variety of combinations of utility function parameters and rates of
return. The earlier assumptions that T50, T'=40, and g.02 are maintained
and it is assumed that n.02.The results bear out the conclusion in
Summers (1981) that for plausible utility functions which generate savings
rates reasonably close to those which are observed, the response of savings
to changes in the rate of return is strong and positive. Calculation of
elasticities is not very meaningful given that rates of return may be
close to zero. In the case where y=-2, which is supported by the empirical
work reported below, each one percentage point increase in the real after
taxrateof return raises savings by about 1.3 percentage points.
As the elasticity of substitution between present and future consumption,
declines the responsiveness of savings to changes in the rate of
return falls off quite sharply. However, it becomes difficult to generate
reasonable sized savings rates, without resort to negative rates of pure time
preference. Furthermore large negative values of y (y￿—5) imply an implausibly
high degree of riskaversion.'
1The empirical work reported below provides strong evidence against the
hypothesis that (y 1 —5).—17—
Table 2
The Interest Sensitivity of Aggregate Savings
(Value of r)
.01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06
=.00 .099 .163 .230 .305 .390 .489
=.01 .024 .087 .152 .222 .299 .389
6 =.02 —.051 .012 .075 .141 .212 .292
I =-l
6 =0 .062 .087 .114 .141 .171 .202
6 =.01 .025 .050 .076 .102 .130 .159
6 =.02 —.013 .013 .038 .064 .091 .119
y =-2
6 =0 .050 .062 .076 .090 .104 .119
6 =.01 .025 .037 .051 .064 .078 .093
o.02 .00 .013 .026 .040 .034 .068
I -5
6 =0 .037 .038 .038 .040 .042 .044
iS.01 .025 .025 .026 .028 .030 .033
o =.02 .012 .013 .014 .016 .018 .021
Note: The calculations all assume that n .02, g =.02,T50 and T' =40.
The numbers in the table are calculated values of
S
(1- t' )wL—18—
These results suggest that if the life cycle model accurately charac-
terizes aggregate savings behavior, reductions in capital income taxes which
increase the after tax rate of return havea significant positive effect on
capital formation. The figures in the table give an indication of the con-
sequences of measures to change the rate of return which are financed using
consumption taxes. As is clear from (8), measures financed with wage taxes
would have a somewhat smaller effect on steady state capital intensity.
The analysis here has considered only the additively separable constant
elasticity utility function. While this is the only utility function which
is both additively separable and homeothetic, the analysis is not completely
general. However, the CES utility function can generate most plausible
types of behavior. As y '--°', itapproaches the %aximin" function. It
is also capable of generating a smooth path of consumption with any given
slope. The model here is also stylized in its treatment of demographic
issues, and its assumption of certainty about the date of death. Tobin
(1967) reports some more realistic simulations which suggest that the re-
sults are not sensitive to these omissions.
Intergenerational Transfers
Much of the theoretical and empirical analysis of savings has been
carried out using models which ignore intergenerational transfers.
Recent research suggests that this is likely to be an important omission.
Laurence Kotlikoff and I (1981) have estimated that about 80 percent ofU.S. wealth holdings are the result of intergenerational transfers rather
than life cycle savings. This finding is corroborated by the work of Mirer
(1979) and Bernheim (1982) suggesting that liquid wealth does not decline with
age following retirement, in contradiction to the implications of the pure life cycle
hypothesis. It is also supported by the fact that the savings rate was quite
high in the 19th century before retirement was an important economic phenomenon.
There are three standard ways of extending the pure life
cycle theory to take account of intergenerational transfers) The most
straightforward is to assume that the utility function in (7) includes the
level of bequests as an additional argument. This modification is exactly
equivalent to treating bequests as an additional form of terminal consumption.
It does not importantly alter the conclusions from the analysis of the
life cycle model. A second possibility is that bequests are involuntary,
resulting from life cycle savings in conjunction with the absence of perfect
annuities markets. In this case, the preceeding analysis is also applicable.
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) call the realism of this possibility into
question by pointing out the role of family risk pooling in providing annuities.
Almost surely a preferable way of introducing intergenerational
transfers is to postulate interdependent utility functions, in which the
utility of parents depends on either the utility or the consumption of their
offspring. That is:
=U(c, (c+1, u2 (c÷3 (10)
where the subscript t now indexes generations. This formulation is
preferable because a motivation for bequests in terms of the welfare of
subsequent generations is introduced. It has the additional virtue of
1) Yet another alternative would be to model "manipulative" bequests as described
in Bernhein, Shleifer and Suniners (1982). This would lead to results quite
similar to those implied by pure life cycle calculations.resolving the conflict between the very high "income elasticity" of bequests
found in cross sectional work, and the much lower elasticity implied by the
absence of secular increases in the savings rate.
Adopting this formulation has radical implications for the
elasticity of savings with respect to the rate of return. Successive sub-
stitution using (10) demonstrates that the problem of generation
t, is to choose to maximize some function of the form:
u= V(C1,
.. .) (11)
In what follows, it is assumed thatthisfunction is homeothetic.
Now suppose that consumption reaches a steady state level Z.
1
It follows
immediately from the assumption that(11)is maximized that:
l t+ =1+r(l—t')=i+6 (12)
Vt CE)
That is, the marginal rate of substitution and the after tax interest rate
are equated. Equation (l2)implies that there is a unique after tax rate
of return which is compatible with the existence of a steady state. It is
notdifficult to verify that if r(i—t') exceeds 6, wealth grows without bound,
and that ifr(1t')is less than 6, itshrinksindefinitely. This implies
thatin the partial equilibrium sense considered here, the long run
elasticityof savings with respect to the after tax rate of return is infinite.
Of course, infinite responses are not observed in the world, because the
accumulation of wealth drives down the rate of return.
1) The argument here could easily be modified to take account of the
effects of population and productivity growth.—2]—
Now suppose that the utility function (10)characterizestilL
behaviorof some but not all economic agents. The remainder can be thought
of as life cycle, rule of thumb, or liquidity constrained consumers. The
argument just made continues to imply that there is only one after tax rate
of return which is compatible with the existence of a steady state.
Otherwise, the wealth of the "bequest" class will be growing without bound,
and so its consumption will be ever increasing. In a setting with some but not
all consumers possessing bequest motives ,thegeneral equilibrium rate of
return will be determined by the bequest consumers. The distribution of wealth
will depend on the savings propensity of the remaining consumers at this
interest rate. It follows that as long as any part of the economy is
characterized by intergenerational altruism of the type suggested by
Barro (1974), the long run partial equilibrium elasticity of savings will
be infinite.
Of course, the long run elasticity may not be a very useful guide to
the short run response of the economy to a tax change. However, the illustrative
calculations of Chamley (1981) suggest that convergence to a new steady state
is fairly rapid. He finds that with a Cobb—Douglas production function, about
10 percent of the adjustment to a new steady state occurs within one year,
in the Cobb—Douglas utility case, and about 7 percent occurs if y =—1.
Much more rapid convergence occurs with elastic labor supply. His
calculations imply that a permanent increase in the after tax interest rate
from 4 to 5 percent would raise savings by 40 percent in the short run in
the Cobb—Douglas case and 30 percent in the y =—lcase, even without
allowing for variable labor supply. These figures would be lower if only_')2_
afraction of savings is done by bequest consumers. However, it should be
emphasized that even if only a small fraction of consumers have bequest
motives, they are likely to account for a large part of the savings. This
inference is supported by the great inequality in wealth
holdings.
The analysis so far has failed to recognize a variety of complicating
factors. Labor supply has been assumed to be inelastic. Relaxing this
assumption would strengthen the conclusions reached here, since increases in
the rate of return would cause consumers to shift their work effort towards
the earlier stages of the life cycle. Liquidity constraints have not been
incorporated into the analysis. Including them would also be likely to
strengthen the conclusion that compensated increases in the net rate
fraction would raise savings. Tax reforms which reduced capital income taxes
would redistribute resources away from the consumers who by definition have
a marginal propensity to save of zero towards other consumers, raising the
aggregate savings rate. A final complicating factor is uncertainty about
future labor income and future rates of return. As Sandmo (1970) has shown,
uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on the level of savings. There does
not seem to be any clear reason for expecting the effects of deterministic
changes in the rate of return,such as would be brought about by tax reforms,
to be affected by the presence of uncertainty.
The theoretical arguments here suggest that economic theory creates
some presumption that savings should respond positively to changes in the
after tax rate of return. The standard argument pointing to conflicting
substitution and income effects is misleading in several respects. First,—23—
for most purposes, it is the compensated effect of changes in interest
rates that is relevant. Second, the usual argument implicitly assumes that
all income is received in the first period. Allowing for human wealth effects
makes it far more plausible that savings respond positively to changes in the
after tax rate of return. Third, the standard analysis neglects the effects
ofheterogeneity emphasized here. As long as some savers have a very elastic
response to changes in interest rates, their behavior is likely to determine
theaggregate response to changes in the rate of return.
While the considerations stressed here are suggestive, it is certainly
possible to construct models in which the rate of savings responds negatively
to increases in the rate of return. The question is ultimately an empirical
issue. In the next sections, we explore alternative empirical approaches to
resolving it.—24—
II. Structural Consumption Function Estimatioi.
A number of studies, including Wright (1969), Weber (1970, 1975).
Boskin (1978), 1-iowrey and Hymans (1980), and Blinder (1981), have attempted
to estimate the effects of changes in the rate of return on consumption and
savings. Despite the profusion of studies, no consensus has been reached.
Only Boskin obtains a statistically significant and substantially positive
estimate of the interest elasticity of savings. I-lowrey and Hymans (1980)
show that his results are sensitive to the choice of sample period and to
issues of data construction. The other studies find insignificant effects,
although in some cases nominal pre—tax rather than real after tax returns
are used in the estimation. As Feldstein (1970) demonstrates, this is
likely to cause serious underestimates of the effects of changes in the properly
measured real net yield.
All of these studies attempt to investigate interest rate effects by
adding an interest rate variable to a standard life cycle consumption
function involving disposable income and wealth as arguments. The coefficient
of the interest rate variable is then used as basis for inferring the
interest elasticity of savings. There are several serious problems with
this type of approach. First, the equation deviates from the life cycle
theory discussed in the preceeding section in several respects. The most
important of these is the inclusion of disposable income rather than an
estimate of human wealth. This obscures an important channel through which
the interest rate night be expected to affect savings and consumption decisions.
M additional problem is posed by the use of an income measure which includes
capital as well as labor income. This leads to a kind of double counting
since the wealth variable already represents the present value of current and
future capital income. The specification also does not allow the propensity
to consume out of wealth to depend on the interest rate as the theoretical
model suggests that it should.The second difficulty is that this specification makes it difficult
to interpret movements in the interest rate. It is not possible to conceive
of circumstances in which the real net yield would change, but disposable
income and wealth would remain constant. This means that the partial
derivativeof the consumption function equation with respect to the included
interest rate variable is not directly informative as to the effect of a
changein the interest rate. Since increases in real interest rates are
likely to be associated with increases in disposable income and decreases in
wealth, there is a strong presumption that the standard procedure will
understate their positive impact on savings.
A third problem with standard consumption function approaches is
difficulty in measuring accurately all the relevant variables. The variable
normally used to proxy the rate of return in most studies is the real after
tax bond yield. This involves the construction of a measure of long term
inflationary expectations, and the average marginal tax rate on interest
income. Neither can be measured with much precision. In any event, bonds
represent only a very small fraction of wealth, so it is unclear how well this
yield provides the rate of return which will be received on all savings.
Insofar as the rate of return is measured with error, the estimated
response of savings to changes in the interest rate will be biased towards
zero. There are equally serious difficulties involved in measuring expected
future income. Lucas (1976) has pointed out the limitations of the
standard distributed lag expectational formulations.
Additional problems with standard consumption functions as vehicles
for examining the interest sensitivity of savings include failure to include
other relevant variables such as those reflecting theage structure of
the population. There is also a problem of simultaneous—26—
equations bias. Savings decisions determine the accumulation
of wealth which in turn affects future income. In an important recent study,
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981) illustrate, in a simulation context, the
seriousness of the problems discussed here. They simulate the behavior of
an economy in which the life cycle hypothesis holds exactly, and then estimate
standard consumption function specifications. The results indicate that
the parameter estimates are extremely sensitive to the choice of sample
period, and that the estimated parameters do not provide a useful guide to
the effects of policy interventions.
These considerations suggest that structural consumption function
estimates do not provide a very useful basis for estimating the effects
of changes in the rate of return on savings behavior. There is some pre-
sumption that the effect is underestimated because of errors in the measurement
of the rate of return and the failure to take account of interest rate effects
on savings and income. In the next section I present estimates of the
effects of the rate of return on savings which are based on the direct
estimation of first order conditions. These circumvent most of the
difficulties raised in the preceeding paragraphs and, I believe, provide the
best available method for estimating the effects of tax policy changes.
Because structural consumption functions have been used in most recent work
in this area, it is perhaps useful to reconsider the role of interest rates
in equations of this type. This is done below. It should be clearly
recognized that these estimates do suffer from some of the problems just
considered, although a number of important difficulties are avoided.
Equation (8a) is approximated by an aggregate consumption function of
the form:—27--
YLC
=r+ ft+Rt) (A + R-fd +
(13)
This equation holds that consumption is a function of total wealth
(including human wealth) with a propensity to consume which depends on the
real after tax long term interest rate .Humanwealth is estimated as
permanent disposable labor income discounted at the sum of the real after
tax long term interest rate and an econometrically estimated risk premium d.
1
Equation (13) is estimated using non—linear least square with annual
data the 1950—1978 period. While it would be possible to estimate this
equation using quarterly data, this was not attempted because the
primary interest here is in the effects of low frequency changes in
the independent variables. The sample period was stopped in 1978
because the disposable labor income series used in the estimation is not
available past that point.
Before examining the results, it is necessary to describe the
construction of the variables. The dependent variable in the equations
reported here is real consumption expenditure per—capita drawn from the
National Income Accounts. This measure treats outlays on durable goods as
consumption rather than savings. The equations were re—estimated for
consumption with the services of durable goods imputed. These modifications
had little impact on the results and are not reported here. The value
of At is the NPS model series on the market value of wealth as reported
in Hayashi (1982). The variable is used in per—capita form. Assets
are included at market value rather than replacement cost. A variety
of measures of permanent labor income, YLe,weretried.
In the results reported here, YLS is estimated as a three period
1The formulation adopted here thusexplicitly models the human wealth effect
discussed above. It also avoids pitfalls in simulation by using disposable
labor income rather than total disposable income. A final advantage of this
formulation is that the interest rate is entered as a factor effecting the
marginal propensity to consume.—28—
distributed lag on per—capita disposable labor income, with the weights
constrained to sum to one. The data on disposable labor income are also
drawn from Hayashi (1982). Alternative lag structures (including relaxing
the sum constraint) had little effect on the results and so the estimates
using them are not reported here.
Four alternative measures of the real after tax rate of return were
tried. The after tax nominal bond yield was proxied alternatively by the
municipal bond yield and by AAA yield multiplied by an estimate of the
average marginal personal tax rate on interest income. Inflation expecta-
tions are proxied using the rolling ARNA procedure described in Sunmiers (1982b),
and a weighted average of past rates of inflation, 71e2 Combining
two alternative bond yields, and two alternative measures of expected
inflation yields four measures of the real after tax rate of return.
The estimated equations are displayed in Table 3. All the equations
yield positive estimates of Simplyingthat y<0. This indicates that
the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is a rising function of
the rate of return. The estimated risk premium used in discounting future
labor income ranges between .09 and .141. While these estimates may seem
large, they are only a little greater than the risk premium attached to
dividend income. Labor income is likely to be much less easily diversified,
so these estimates are not unreasonable. It is encouraging that
similar estimates are obtained using each of the rate of return variables.
In all cases the explanatory power of the equations is very high, and
comparable to that of standard structural consumption functions.
The two effects of interest rate changes in the equations reported in
Table 3 conflict. Increases in the interest rate reduce human wealth, but
1Thisterminology maybe misleading since d will also capture the
effectsoftrend growth in income.Table 3
Structural Consumption Function Equations
Equation _____l d 13W
1 R =R ire —.001 .405 .066 .094 .994 1.49 1 mun 1
(.063) (.125) (.014) (.028)
2 R =R e
—.318 .318 .090 .137 .993 1.66 2 mun 2
(.090) (.100) (.012) (.029)
3
R3=RA.(1_0)_irel
.012 .397 .068 .101 .993 1.40
(.074) (.149) (.017) (.036)
4
R4=R•(l—e)— 337 .324 .090 .137 .994 1.63 AAA 2
(.088) (.097) (.012) (.028)
Note: Estimates obtained using nonlinear least squares for the 1950—1978
period. Distributed lag weights used in forming YLe are not reported.—30—
Table 4
Effects of a 1 Percentage Point Change in the Rate of Return
on Consumption and Saving
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Initil R %AC %AS %AC %xS
—.02 —2.48 20.73 —1.61 13.44 —1.96 16.42 —1.53 12.82
—.01 —1.61 13.49 —1.18 9.90 —1.25 10.46 —1.12 9.32
0 —.97 8.09 —.84 6.99 —.71 5.94 —.77 6.45
.01 —.48 3.99 —.55 4.59 —.29 2.45 —.49 4.08
Note: These estimates are based on the equations reported in Table 3. All the
calculations are done using 1978 values for the independent variables
other than R. The calculations assume that no other variable changes
when R does.-3]—
raise the propensity to consume out of wealth. The total effect of changes
in the real rate of return is evaluated in Table 4. The effect of a 1 percent
increase in the real rate of return on consumption expediture and savings
is calculated using 1978 values of the exogenous variables and various
initial real rates of return. These calculations refer to the effect of a
change in the real return caused by a reduction in taxes on interest income,
which is compensated for by a change in taxes on consumption expenditure.
The results almost universally suggest than an increase in the after tax
real return would have a significant effectJ
For most of the last few years, real after tw bQnd yields have been significantly
below zero. The estimates here thus suggest that a one percent increase in
the real rate of return would be likely to raise savings by close to 10 percent
in the short run.
These estimates suggest thatstructuralconsumption functions
estimated in ways consistent with the underlying theory, imply significant
effects of interest rates on savings.2 However, they involve
a somewhat unsatisfactory treatment of expectations, and serious problems
in measuring expected real returns. An alternative approach is presented in
the next section.
1The numbers in %AC columns of the table should beinterpreted as the change
in consumption inclusive of consumption taxes.
21t might be objected that this isa consequence of the specification's
twinning the labor income and rate of return variables. Efforts to
explore this by adding YLt as a separate variable were not successful
because the parameter estimates failed to converge._32.
III.Direct Estimation of Utility Function Parameters
This section reports on an attempt to directly estimate the parameters of
the utility function of the representative consumer. The approach here follows
the work of Grossman and Shiller (1981) ,Hall(1981) ,Hansenand Singleton
(1981), and Mankiw (1981) in attempting to estimate the Euler equation for the
representative consumers' stochastic dynamic optimization problem. Their work
is extended by allowing for the possibility that some consumers are liquidity
constrained.
Consider a consumer choosing a lifetime consumption plan. She always has
the option of consuming one dollar more or less at time t, and investing or




whereis the subjective discount rate attached by the consumer to future
utility and r is the real return on any freely traded risky asset
and is the full information set at time t. Note that the
first order condition given by (14) will be satisfied for any free traded asset
evenif someassets such as human capital cannot be traded freely. This con-
ditionwill hold for consumers who expect with certainty to be alive in the next
period regardless of the length of horizon of their maximization problem.
Note also that this condition does not depend on anyassumptionsabout expec-
tations regarding future labor income or rates of return. Theassumptionis
maintained here that different types of consumptionmay beaggregated and that
the utility function is separable in consumption and leisure. The importance
andvalidity of these assumptions are discussed in Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers
(1982).—33--
in order to exploit (14) it is necessary to assume that aggregate
consumption can usefully be modelled as the outcome of utility maximization
by a representative individual, It should be clear that this assumption
is not exactly accurate. However, it is to be hoped that the estimated
utility function for the representative consumer in some sense typifies
individual utility functions. Grossman and Shiller (1981) rigorously
justify this hope in a continuous time setting. I assume that the
instantaneous utility function has the familiar constant elasticity form
CI




where is orthogonal to any element of and is serially uncorrelated.
Given data on consumption and the returns on an asset, the parameters
óand yin (15) can be estimated using non—linear two stage least squares.
Any element of which can help to forecast r can be used as an instrument.'
Before turning to a discussion of the cholies made in actually
estimating (15), it may be helpful to comment on the underlying economics.
Consider the special case where r is nonstochastic. Equation (15) then
holds that the growth rate in consumption is dependent on the real return
r. The greater is the responsiveness, the greater is the implied value
of y. Essentially y is estimated from information on the strength of the
relation between consumption and er-ante real returns.
1For more details on the estimation procedure, see Hansen and Singleton
(1981) or Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1982). Note that the assumption
of conditional homeoscedasticity is maintained here. This does not
affect the consistency of the estimates but may bias the standard errors.—34—
In estimating (15) one must choose a meaaure of consumption,
and asset return, as well as the sample period and data frequency.
In an effort to wdfy the robustness of the conclusions, a variety of
different implementations of (is) were estimated. Three alternative
measures of consumption were used, including total real consumption expen-
ditures, consumption of non—durables and services and consumption of
non—durables alone. The choice between these concepts involves trading
off comprehensiveness, and the problem of expenditure diverging from
the service flow for durable goods. Consumption was measured either per
adult (16 and over), or "per adjusted capita", weighting each cohort according
to its relative consumption. The latter procedure controls for movements
in consumption due to the changing age composition of the population.
The estimates were performed with both quarterly and annual data.
Since the results are very similar, the more precise estimates obtained
with quarterly data are reported here. The real after tax return on
corporate stocks, long term government bonds, treasury bills, and savings
deposits were used as proxies for r in these estimates. Inflation was
calculated using the price deflator for the consumption concept appropriate
to each equation. A thirty percent tax rate on interest and dividends
was assumed, while capital gains on stocks and bonds were assumed to be
untaxed.1
The results of estimating (15)using a variety of specifications
are shown in Table 5. In each case, two lagged real returns, two
lagged values of inflation, and two lagged consumption growth rates
1Alternative assumptions about taxation had little effect on the results.
The tax series in the previous section was not used because weighting
by interest income in finding the average marginal tax rate is not

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are used as instruments. The results in Table S are not
very sensitive to the choice of a consumption concept. However
they are quite dependent on which asset is used in the estimation. In
general, the point estimate of y is greater using treasury bills, time
deposits or government bonds, in the estimation than it is using stocks.
Using assets other than stocks, the data suggest that the utility
function is approximately logarithmic (y=0) .Theestimate appears to be
fairly precise. In each case one can conclude at a very high level
of confidence that y>—3. The estimated value of y varies between -2.83
and —18.0 using corporate stocks to representrt. However in only one
case are the estimates strongly inconsistent with the hypothesis that
y=0.
The estimates of the intertemporal utility function derived fr®m the equations
using treasury bills and time deposits to prov asset returns are to be pre-
ferred on both economic and econometric grounds. The first order condition (14)
on which the estimation is based is only valid for assets which are freely
priced. The vast najority of consumption is done by persons who do not directly
hold any equity or long term bonds. Nor are they short in these assets. While
it is conceivable that some individuals are at an interior solution which calls
for exactly zero holdings of these assets, it is unlikely that this con-
sideration can account for the fact that most indivudals never buy or sell these
assets despite changing economic condition. If the assets used to proxy r is
not freely traded by all consumers, inconsistent estimates will result.
The econometric difficulty with using long term bond yields or
stockmarket returns involves the problem of "overfitting" in the first stage of
two stage least squares. As Merton (1981) and many others have noted, it is
extremely difficult to demonstrate that there is any variation in the expected—37—
return on the market. The difficulty arises because of the markets extrern-
volatility. While instrumental variables will yield consistent estimates of the
model's parameters, they are unlikely to be unbiased because the first stage of
the estimation procedure is likely to find spurious variations in the ex—ante
real rate. Hall (1981) demonstrates this by showing that the fitted values of
the first stage of the estimation yield very implausible estimates of the ex—
ante rate of return. Because of their substantial volatility, a similar point
applies to the use of bond returns.
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that the value of y is not a
large negative number. As the simulations in the preceding section illustrate,
this means that savings are very responsive to changes in real after tax
rates of return. Indeed it is precisely the fact that the growth rate of
consumption depends strongly on the expected real rate of return that drives
these results.
It should be acknowledged that the overidentifying restrictions
implied by (15) frequently fail. Similar findings have been reported by
others including Mankiw (1981) and Hansen and Singleton (1981). This
does not seem to me to be a cause for concern. Before embarking on
estimation of the type reported here, one knows that the model is not
literally true. Therefore with enough data one can be certain of rejecting
the model at any desired level of significance. Learning that the model
fails tells at least as much about the quantity and quality of data
available as it does about the model.
The important question is whether or not there is evidence that
consumers are liquidity constrained and so are unable to satisfy the first—38-
order condition U4). Flavin (1981), Hall and Mishkin (1982) and Hayashi
(1982) have all suggested that some consumers are liquidity constrained.
This possibility can be examined by extending the model to allow for the
possibility that a fraction of disposable labor income is consumed directly
by liquidity constrained or rule of thumb consumers. In this case,
equation (15) becomes:





The parameter £ can then be estimated along with y and
The results of estimating (16) are displayed in Table 6. Theyprovide
little support for the hypothesis that liquidity constraints areimportant.
In every case, the hypothesis that £=O cannot berejected. The
estimates of £ are as often negative as positive. There is no evidence
that supplementing the intertemporal optimization model with a simple
Keynesian consumption function improves its performance. Nor is thereany
indication that the estimated value of y is affected.
The results in this section provide very strong support for the
hypothesis that savings are responsive to real returns. Direct estimation
of utility function parameters suggests that the the elasticity of
substitution between present and future consumption is quite high. This
leads ineluctably to a high long run response of savings to rates of
return. Calculations of the type reported in Summers (1981) and Table 2
suggest an interest elasticity of savings greater than unity. Of course
these results came from a restrictive model of optimization by arepre-
sentative consumer. The next section takes a different approach by
examining in an atheoretic way the relation between wealth accumulation






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IV. Wealth Accumulation Equations
The approaches in the preceding two sections focused on effects of
the rate of return on consumption decisions. This section examines the
effect of changes in the rate of return of desired wealth holding. The
hypothesis being tested is that increases in the rate of return raise the
desirec level of sealth holding relative to labor income. This relationship
is an implication of all the models of savings behavior developed in







Thisleads to the estimating equation:
(-4-)= a+ SRt + (1-A) + u (18)
The data and sample period are the same as those used in Section II.
Before turning to the results it is important to note that there are strong
reasons to expect the estimate of Stobe biased downwards. The value of
Rt will be negatively correlated with the error term in (18) because
increases in the capital stock reduce the real rate of return and because
increases inR will be associated with downwards recapitalizations of
asset values. Also as argued above,R is likely to be measured with
substantial error.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results uniformly suggest that increases in the long term rate of
return are associated with increases in the wealth labor income ratio —-
despitethe biases noted in the previous paragraph. This conclusion is
robust to variations in the sample period and the way in which the real
rate of return is measured. They are also insensitive to the choice
between actual labor income and its trend value as a scaling variable.
The estimates here imply that wealth accumulation is quite sensitive
to the rate of return. Increases of one percentage point in the real
after tax rate of return are estimated to increase the desired wealth—labor
income ratio by about .15 or 3 percent. Adjustment appears to be quite
rapid with mean lags on the order of two years. This suggests that savings
are likely to be very responsive for the short run to changes in the real
after tax return.
The model here is quite crude in that it does not include many other
determinants of wealth—labor income ratio, such as demographic variables and
changing expectations of future income growth. It is possible that this leads
to biased estimates of the effects of changes in the after tax rate of
return, although there is no presumption as to the direction of the bias.
Proxies for other factors affecting savings were not included because of
the difficulty in estimating the effects of slowly changing variables, using
short time series.—43--
V. Conclusions
The theoretical and empirical results in this paper make a strong
prima fade case for the proposition that increases in the rate of return
are likely to bring forth significant increases in saving. Theoretical
analysis indicates that a variety of standard models tend to suggest that
the aggregate response to savings incentives is likely to be substantial.
It is argued that the existing empirical evidence sheds little light on
the question. Empirical analysis is then conducted using three alternative
approaches. All three suggest a significant response of savings to changes
in the rate of return.
While the work in this paper suggests strong rate of return effects
on savings, it is too crude to provide a basis for estimating the effects
of savings incentives frequently considered by policymakers. A micro—
econometric approach recognizing the non—linearities introduced into
consumers' budget by tax incentive schemes such as IRAs, would be necessary
for this task. The techniques in Section III of this paper can easily be
adapted to the study of individual consumption behavior. Such research would
also shed light on the extent of heterogeneity among consumers and the
importance of liquidity constraints.—4 /—
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